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- simplification o f  customs and border procedures;
- improvement o f  the system of trans-border trade;
- innovative development at the regional level;
- environmental protection;
- the development o f  major infrastructure projects between Ukraine and Russia (in 
particular, the construction o f  transport bridge across the Kerch Strait).
At the Forum the Program o f  interregional and trans-border cooperation between Ukraine 
and the Russian Federation for 2011-2016 year was signed. Currently preparation o f  a plan for 
the implementation o f  this program, which will contain specific activities for the development o f  
interregional cooperation on the basis o f  proposals from Ukrainian and Russian regions is 
conducted.
There are two other formats o f  the Ukrainian-Russian interregional cooperation:
- Council o f  heads o f  border areas o f  Ukraine, Russia and Belarus (founded in January
1994);
- A Permanent Meeting o f  Heads o f  the regions o f  Ukraine and Russia -  the 
«Commonwealth Regions" (an agreement was signed on May 18,2003 in Odessa) [3].
Thus, as a promising tool for the creation o f  the regional growth pole to promote the 
sustainable development o f  the region both for Russia and Ukraine it is possible to use the 
existing forms o f  interregional and trans-border cooperation, including already existing 
euroregions.
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WTO ACCESSION AS A  CONDITION OF RUSSIAN EXTERNAL COMPETITIVENESS 
IN THE WEST EUROPEAN MARKET
V.A, Byhovets. N.A. Grineva 
Belgorod, Russia
After the collapse o f  the Soviet Union economic relations o f  Russia started to be domi­
nated with Western countries, mainly the EU members, trade with which grew rapidly. The chief 
factors o f  rapid development o f  trade and economic cooperation between Russia and the EU are: 
the geographic proximity, the interconnectivity o f  the economies and infrastructures, the availa­
bility o f  the legal framework o f  interaction, long-standing business culture.
The EU is Russia’s largest trading partner. But in terms o f  trade and investment, Russia 
does not matter to the EU to the same extent that the EU matters to Russia. Russia is Europe’s 
third largest export market, while Russia's own export has been dominated by oil and gas.
This thesis can be illustrated with the analysis o f  volumes o f  Russian-EU export and im­
port in 2006-2010. In 2006-2008, Russian export to the EU, predominantly commodities, in­
creased by 56,1% while import from the EU to Russia increased by 90,4%. Due to the Global 
Financial Crisis Russian export to the EU dropped by 40%, while the EU export to Russia -  by 
35,7%.
However, in 2010 the situation stabilized. That year Russian export increased by 30,9%, 
imports -  by 27,6%. Furthermore, in general, in 2006-2010 we experienced the 23,2%-increase 
o f the export and 55% -  o f  the import. So w e may conclude that the dynamics o f  Russian export 
and import with the EU suffered due to the decline in 2009, while in 2010 the mutual trade re­
vived [1].
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The analysis o f  the EU and Russia trade relations would be incomplete without mention­
ing Germany as the largest foreign investor and trade partner o f  Russia. Russia also values Ger­
many as the biggest customer for its gas, and now sees it as an influential advocate for its inter­
ests in the West.
Germany’s attitude towards Russia is more complex, combining economic calculations 
with the legacies o f  the Second World War and o f  Soviet domination o f Communist East Ger­
many. Germany is seen in Russia as the gateway to Europe. The roots o f  the economic relation­
ship are deep: Germany was Russia’s biggest trading partner before the First World War, 
throughout the inter-war period, and again after the Cold War. Even during the Cold War, Ger­
many was the USSR’s biggest Western economic partner. In 2005, Germany’s trade with Russia 
amounted to an impressive €38.9 billion. Russia also meets 42% o f  German gas needs, making 
Germany Russia’s most important gas market. German energy companies are vital to the Ger- 
man-Russia partnership, to the extent that the only foreigner on Gazprom’s board o f  directors is 
a representative o f  Germany’s E.ON. Germany and Russia are also connected with the work un­
der the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic seabed. Although Angela Merkel has been more 
vocal in her criticism o f  Russia’s political set-backs and its energy policies than her Social Dem­
ocratic predecessor, the political partnership with Russia continues to be strong [2].
The economic inter-dependence o f  Germany and Russia already goes deep. Both major 
German political parties -  Mrs Merkel's Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats led by 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier -  make clear there is no turning back from a close 
embrace o f  Russia.
In 2011 in Sochi the German chancellor and Russian president unveiled plans for closer 
collaboration. They include a joint venture to create a world leader in building nuclear power 
plants, and state-backed export credits to lift German industry out o f  its downturn and help 
struggling Russian firms through the credit crunch. Russia was invited to step in to rescue ailing 
German shipyards, a memory chip plant and the Opel car firm. The two leaders will also set up a 
joint energy agency with wide powers to improve security o f  supplies and energy efficiency. It 
confirmed Russia's policy o f  favouring Germany, exemplified by the controversial Nord Stream 
pipeline project to take Russian gas under the Baltic Sea to a terminal on the German coast, by­
passing transit states like Ukraine and Poland.
The important fact for Russia’s economy is that now Europe seems bound to follow  
where Germany leads.
But anyway there are a lot o f  problems which hinder German-Russian relations. In the fo­
reground here are various obstacles in the form o f  anti-dumping procedures, quantitative restric­
tions in respect o f  certain goods (such as rolled steel, aluminum, agricultural products), restric­
tions on the exchange o f  high-technology products and services. On the other hand, the instabili­
ty o f  the economic situation in Russia, the decline in its export potential, the instability o f  foreign 
trade legislation, high crime rates in the business, raw nature o f  export -  all this influence nega­
tively trade relations with Germany and the EU countries in general. In addition, the expansion 
o f  Russian exports in the European market is hindered with their poor quality, limited range, lack 
o f  high-tech products, design flaws, as well as with the discrepancy between rigid rules and stan­
dards, particularly regarding safety and the environment.
Thus to improve the prospects o f  Russia's foreign trade with Germany and other coun­
tries o f  the EU w e should first o f  all solve a number o f  internal problems that limit our coopera­
tion with foreign countries and impede the development o f  trade relations with the EU.
The one o f  the most significant events that influence the international position o f  Russia 
is it’s entering the World Trade Organization (WTO), which took place in the end o f  2011. For­
merly Russia was the largest economy in the world that was not a member o f  the World Trade 
Organization. Russia applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in June 1993 and the GATT Working Party was transformed into the World Trade Or­
ganization Working Party in 1995. President Vladimir Putin has made WTO accession a priority
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for Russia, and after languishing for several years, the Russian accession negotiations began to 
see real progress under his Administration.
Russia has finally joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) at a ceremony in Switzer­
land 16.11.2011, after 18 years negotiating its membership. The Swiss brokered a deal between 
Russia and Georgia earlier that year that removed the last obstacle to Russia's accession. Georgia 
had tried to block Russia's WTO entry since the two countries fought a short war in 2008. Russia 
was by far the biggest economy yet to join the global trade body. It is also the last member o f  the 
Group o f  20 major economies to join, after China gained membership in 2001.
The removal o f  trade barriers is likely to stimulate greater and more diversified trade be­
tween Russia and the rest o f  the world. According to some forecasts Russian membership will 
boost its economy by tens o f  billions o f  dollars each year. Due to becoming a WTO member, 
Russia will have to import certain rules and regulations that will address the very issues that for­
eign investors usually complain about, like corruption, the protection o f  minority shareholders 
and the independence o f  the judiciary [3].
The fact o f  Russia’s joining the WTO aroused hot discussions in the public and scientific 
literature o f  the advantages and disadvantages o f  this step. Some experts argue that joining the 
WTO will create the right conditions for the further improvement o f  Russian business climate, 
for an influx o f  foreign investment and for boosting Russian export while also retaining the pos­
sibility o f  giving support to key branches o f  Russia’s economy. Russia is achieving a completely 
new level o f  integration into the global economic system.
Perhaps the most commonly mentioned issue related to WTO membership is the lower­
ing o f  import tariffs. A  so-called “tariff disarmament” that would necessarily accompany a Rus- 
sia-EU free trade area would probably last 7 to 10 years and will proceed through annual gradual 
reductions in tariffs on finished goods. A lso the free trade area agreement must provide for a 
possible temporary freeze on -  or possibly even an increase in -  tariffs i f  there emerge imbal­
ances on individual goods markets, thereby jeopardizing national production and employment. 
The same action must be taken in case o f  serious disproportions in the balance o f  payments.
In case that the free trade area brings positive results with regard to the industrial goods, 
eventually there will emerge an issue o f  mutual liberalization in the movement o f  services. This 
will take much more time and will require stage-by-stage conclusion o f corresponding agree­
ments for each specific kind o f  services (transport, insurance, tourism, etc.) [4].
In estimating the customs value o f  goods and determining the state o f  goods’ origin, the EU 
abides by the rules o f  the World Trade Organization and has not yet introduced any specific regu­
lations in this field. The future Russia-EU free trade area must be a realm where corresponding 
WTO rules are applied. Russia’s goal is committed adherence to these rules, which, to date, has not 
been fully achieved. If in the course o f  building a free trade area, Russia and the European Union 
liberalize their mutual trade, the parties in many cases will have no other way to protect their na­
tional production, markets, employment and social stability than by taking measures that involve 
non-tariff regulation. Therefore, any future agreement between Russia and the EU must include 
rules for taking such measures by the parties in the spirit o f  consistent trade liberalization.
In the field o f  non-tariff regulation, the EU, as a rule, also abides by WTO international 
legal norms. If the proposed Russia-EU free trade area agreement has references to correspond­
ing WTO documents that would suffice. However, the agreement must contain special instruc­
tions and regulations on some non-tariff restrictions where the European Union applies its own 
norms and rules. This concerns anti-dumping measures, technical and ecological standards and 
norms, and measures o f  sanitary and phytosanitary control [4].
If a free trade area does become a reality, the EU will eventually demand equal condi­
tions for participating in competitive biddings, along with Russian companies; this would include 
Russian state orders for the supply o f  goods and services and for construction projects in Russia. 
If this issue arises (which will happen most likely in the long term), Russia must address it on the 
basis o f  the principles o f  reciprocity and mutual benefit.
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International free trade experience, above all in the EFTA, shows that the liberalization of  
trade in finished goods -  especially machines and equipment -  in the course o f  building a free trade 
area promotes specialization and cooperation in research and production between the parties. On this 
basis, there is a stimulation o f  investment cooperation, mainly in mutual direct investment. The libe­
ralization o f trade will also provide the EU with cheaper direct investment in the Russian Federation 
when establishing branches o f  European companies and joint ventures, and will reduce their produc­
tion and marketing costs (including in the area o f  components supply).
At the same time, however, opening up the Russian market will mean the direct export o f  
products -  via European firms -  produced in other countries, which will weaken interest in in­
vestment in Russia as a way to penetrate its domestic market. But on the whole, the formation of  
a free trade area will increase direct investment from the European Union, most importantly in 
the manufacturing industry.
To this end, M oscow will need to conduct active negotiations with the European Union. 
The EU will start deriving immediate benefits from the free trade area, while Russia will first 
have to overcome difficulties caused by economic restructuring. Therefore, M oscow has all 
grounds to expect commensurate concessions and privileges from Brussels. This would include 
investment cooperation, as well as the introduction o f  a visa-free regime that would provide easy 
access for Russian manpower to labor markets in EU member countries on the basis o f  tempo­
rary contracts.
It must be emphasized that immigration restrictions and the strict Schengen regime apply 
to Russian citizens in full measure. The usual allegations by leading European politicians and 
high-ranking officials from Brussels and Strasbourg, which say that Russia is denied visa-free 
travel due to its so-called instability, are absolutely unconvincing considering Russia’s real situa­
tion. Meanwhile, the EU offers visa-free entry to citizens o f  about 60 other countries, including 
much less stable states than Russia (for example, Argentina). Such discrimination contradicts the 
very idea for creating a Russia-EU free trade area and, moreover, a Common Economic Area.
From, the very beginning o f  the free trade area negotiations, Russia should have sought a 
framework agreement on the regulation o f  labor migration in the future Common Economic 
Area. On the basis o f  such a document, Moscow would be in the position to conclude corres­
ponding bilateral agreements with participating countries. Such agreements must ensure equal 
rights for Russian labor migrants -  at least with labor migrants from third countries (Turkey, 
etc.). They also must regulate their employment, employment quotas, social issues (such as re­
muneration o f  labor, health services, pension schemes, and unemployment insurance), and the 
duration o f  labor contracts. Full account must be given to Russia’s interests.
The formation o f  a Russia-EU free trade area is impossible without the free movement o f 
Russian citizens and shipments across “European” land, that is, between the Kaliningrad exclave 
and mainland Russia. It is important that this movement be essentially simplified already at the 
initial stage o f  the future free trade area negotiations.
Although there are a lot o f  problems, Russia’s becoming the WTO member certainly gives 
a positive political signal. It indicates clear support for a more liberal economic policy despite the 
expression o f  protectionist views. Russia has pronounced its endeavour to further integration into 
the global economy and to adoption o f  the common practices o f  international business. Neverthe­
less WTO membership is not a panacea for all the problems in the Russian markets, it won’t make 
Russia competitive in the West European market automatically, though it is an important step to­
wards greater efficiency and predictability in the Russian business environment.
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